I move that this House
(1) notes that:
(a) foreign interference online poses a unique risk to the national security of Australia, particularly on social media platforms;
(b) these platforms have been successfully weaponised by authoritarian states in an attempt to interfere in our democracy; and
(c) under the previous Government, Australia led the world with its foreign interference, espionage and influence reforms of 2018;
(2) acknowledges that:
(a) the cybersecurity measures implemented by the previous Government are now being adopted by likeminded countries around the world; and
(b) cyber-enabled foreign interference is a unique challenge which requires further reforms; and
(3) calls on the Government to continue to monitor and adapt to the ever-changing threats posed by foreign actors in cyberspace.
It’s crucial to recognise that foreign actors, including intelligence services, are pursuing opportunities to interfere with and influence Australian society in a number of ways, including through governments at all levels, businesses, academia and a range of other sectors. Diaspora communities and the higher education sector have been identified as particularly vulnerable to attempts by foreign bodies to exert influence. These foreign actors aim to undermine Australia’s national security, our democratic system of government and our sovereignty. They can do this through methods which many of us are already familiar when we think of traditional espionage—things like spying—but also through coercive methods in online and emerging technologies, including social media platforms. These activities are contrary to our sovereignty, our values and the national interest. Recently, Mike Burgess, the director of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, or ASIO, declared that espionage and foreign interference is now ASIO’s ‘principal security concern’, and Australians need to be aware of this changing threat environment and what that can look like for them.
My colleague Senator James Paterson has spearheaded the establishment of the Senate Select Committee on Foreign Interference through Social Media to probe concerns into social media applications headquartered in authoritarian countries, which pose a unique risk to the national security of Australia. China’s 2017 national security law means businesses registered in China can be compelled to hand over information to assist Chinese intelligence agencies and to keep this cooperation a secret. This is, of course, a huge concern. I note that the Minister for Home Affairs has been considering a security review that is expected to recommend that Australia follow the United States, United Kingdom and New Zealand in restricting the social media app, TikTok. I would urge the government to ensure it acts swiftly to formally restrict TikTok on devices of all federal government employees and politicians, instead of the currently inconsistent approach, and swiftly implement the full range of regulatory responses needed to protect the private information of Australians who do use TikTok. It’s also important to inform Australians about why such a crucial movement would be necessary so Australians can increase their awareness to potential foreign interference dangers. We do know that foreign interference can extend to the political realm in things like elections, and the coalition has, indeed, raised concerns about the upcoming referendum on the Voice. We want to make sure that the referendum process has integrity at every step.
ASIO recently warned that foreign interference and the spread of disinformation are made easier by social media algorithms, which are often kept secret, allowing platforms to put forward content, allowing for anonymity and providing limited moderation. ASIO warned that social media’s weak identity verification could even be weaponised. The members on this side know all too well how important it is to ensure we have strong national security legislation and online safety laws. During our time in government, the coalition made world-leading reforms to combat the risks of foreign interference to protect Australians and businesses, including creating criminal offences for espionage and foreign interference activities; launching guidelines to educate at-risk sectors about the dangers posed by foreign interference, to increase their resilience; passing the Electoral Legislation Amendment (Electoral Funding and Disclosure Reform) Act 2018 to restrict the receipt of donations from foreign donors; and establishing the Counter Foreign Interference Taskforce to further boost our ability to discover, track and disrupt foreign interference in all forms.
This brought together officers from ASIO, AUSTRAC, ASD and the AFP to work toward the common goal of identifying and disrupting malicious activity. The coalition certainly understands the importance of maintaining a strong national security focus, and, as a nation, we must remain vigilant to the threat of foreign interference in its many forms, and we call on the government to monitor and adapt to the ever-changing online threats to our sovereignty and our security.